Judge, Jury & Encryptioner: Exceptional Device Access with a Social Cost by Servan-Schreiber, Sacha & Wheeler, Archer
Judge, Jury & Encryptioner:
Exceptional Device Access with a Social Cost
Sacha Servan-Schreiber∗ † (B)
MIT CSAIL
Archer Wheeler∗ ‡
Brown Univerity
Abstract
We present Judge, Jury and Encryptioner (JJE) an excep-
tional access scheme for unlocking devices that does not give
unilateral power to any single authority. JJE achieves this by
placing final approval to unlock a device in the hands of peer
devices. JJE distributes maintenance of the protocol across a
network of “custodians” such as courts, government agencies,
civil rights watchdogs, and academic institutions. Unlock re-
quests, however, can only be approved by a randomly selected
set of recently active peer devices that must be physically lo-
cated by law enforcement in order to gain access to the locked
device. This requires that law enforcement expend both hu-
man and monetary resources and pay a “social cost” in order
to find and request the participation of random device owners
in the unlock process.
Compared to other proposed exceptional access schemes,
we believe that JJE mitigates the risk of mass surveillance,
law enforcement abuse, and vulnerability to unlawful attack-
ers. While we propose a concrete construction, our primary
goal with JJE is to spur discussion on ethical exceptional
access schemes that balance privacy of individuals and the
desires of law enforcement. JJE transparently reveals the use
of exceptional access to the public and enforces a fixed social
cost that, we believe, can be an effective deterrent to mass
surveillance and abuse.
1 Introduction
On December 7th, 2018, Australia passed a series of con-
troversial and contested laws designed to compel technol-
ogy companies to provide law enforcement and government
agencies access to all encrypted communications [38, 39]. In
September of 2019, the U.K. government ruled that Facebook
and WhatsApp are required to share private messages with the
police to assist in criminal investigations [16]. More recently,
∗Both authors contributed equally to this work.
†3s@mit.edu
‡archer_wheeler@brown.edu
the Attorney General of the United States called on Apple to
unlock two iphones owned by a terrorist with no clear plan
for how to do so without jeopardizing the security and privacy
of law abiding citizens [8].
These events raise important security, political, and ethical
questions for both the åcryptography and technology policy
communities. This recent legislation in both Australia and the
U.K. is of great interest to the Five Eyes intelligence compact
(U.S., U.K., Australia, Canada & New Zealand). In 2018,
the Five Eyes issued a joint statement advocating for lawful
electronic interception [1]. These recent developments raise
the fear that other countries, specifically the United States,
will enact similar laws to that of Australia and the U.K. [27].
The advent of encryption-by-default for many smartphones
and instant messaging applications has left law enforcement
and intelligence agencies worried that many of their surveil-
lance tools, purportedly used for national security, could “go
dark” [1]. As several recent events have demonstrated, law
enforcement and government officials firmly believe that they
are entitled to “exceptional access” to encrypted data and de-
vices, sparking significant pushback by both the private sector
and the academic cryptography community [1, 48].
There is an understanding among the security and privacy
experts that building “backdoors” into devices fundamentally
compromises security [2, 14]. Unfortunately, the technical
nuances of this reasoning is often lost in the policy making
process. Moreover, the vocal opposition to giving law enforce-
ment access to devices has not been successful in stopping
countries from pushing for more legislation surrounding in-
tercept technologies [27, 38, 39]. It is therefore imperative
to understand the consequences and discuss practical solu-
tions to this problem. Our goal is not to advocate for the
deployment of exceptional access but rather to instigate
discussion into the trade offs needed to build ethical ex-
ceptional access schemes.
As recently pointed out by Ray Ozzie [40], it is the re-
sponsibility of the cryptography community to ensure that
backdoors are not implemented in a manner which could have
serious long-term security implications. Our goal is to ad-
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dress the concerns of law enforcement at face value while still
constructing a system which mitigates the concerns of abuse
posed by the cryptographic and policy community. We do not
expect our proposal will be preferable to law enforcement
compared to existing methods of “backdoors” or key escrow.
Rather, we hope to show that ethical solutions are feasible,
and we hope to provide a counter argument to the reasoning
that carte blanche government backdoors are necessary to
maintain effective national security.
In this work, we present an exceptional access scheme, JJE,
that decentralizes the trust and unlock process without placing
unilateral power in the government’s hands. From a high level,
our scheme works as follows: At set up, each device secretly
and blindly chooses a number of other anonymous devices
to act as its “access delegates.” Crucially, the device chooses
these delegates at random with no knowledge of who they
are selecting and this selection does not leave the device. It
then builds a unique exceptional access challenge which can
be turned into an unlock token by a subset of the chosen
delegates.
To use the exceptional access scheme, law enforcement
needs approval from a set of “custodians” in order to iden-
tify and physically locate the delegates. Each delegate device
provides a necessary signature through a secure hardware pro-
tocol that does not compromise the security or privacy of the
delegate. Once a sufficient number of signatures are obtained,
they can be used to unlock the locked device. Finding and
accessing all of the needed delegate devices requires broad
manpower and access to intelligence that only the govern-
ment has. This aspect of JJE is intangible and difficult to steal
even by a determined adversary, making JJE robust against
malicious foreign state actors or other well funded attackers.
1.1 Ethical Implications
The strong opinion of the cryptography community is that
building backdoor technology is inherently misguided as it
cannot be done while maintaining the security of cryptogra-
phy [30]. However, the vocal opposition of the community has
not caused the problem to go away [27, 38, 39]. It is apparent
that there is a disconnect between researchers who deeply un-
derstand the problem and legal experts who, perhaps naively,
seek a solution that simply works. What governments want is
a slight weakening in individual privacy for the gain of secu-
rity as a nation [21, 48]. On the other hand, many researchers
believe that any such “slight” weakening exposes the real
possibility of massive security vulnerabilities and provides
governments with yet another tool for mass surveillance [2].
It is tempting for members of the academic cryptography
community to answer questions seeking secure backdoors
with an unequivocal, “not possible.” In fact, the technical
argument for why this is impossible is a tautology: if you
provide access to someone else, then your system is insecure
because someone else, possibly less trustworthy, now has
access too. History has shown that this is not just a problem
in theory. In fact, any centralized database, no matter how
practically secure, is susceptible to attack [37]. While this
fact is likely obvious to the technically savvy reader, it is not
so inherently obvious to a lay person or to a politician [48]
making the privacy community come across as recalcitrant
on the subject.
The situation is complicated by the fact that the political
playbook used to argue for the existence of exceptional access
plays to fears and emotions. A common argument used by
policy makers advocating against encryption goes as follows:
Imagine there is a terrorist who will imminently attack unless
we can unlock this phone, on the spot, and discover their
plan [29]. By focusing on such an extreme scenario, advocates
against strong encryption argue it is reasonable to weaken
security for all devices.
However, currently deployed and proposed systems allow
governments to use the same access system for mass surveil-
lance, or to weaken the legal rights of individuals simply
accused of low level crimes [48].
Ultimately, the legal line between security and privacy will
be determined not by cryptographers, but by policy experts,
the industry, and consumers. However, we believe that it is of
crucial importance that the research community engages in a
discussion regarding potential solutions in order to attempt
to bridge a gap, and that it does so judiciously. Our goal is to
instigate research of ethical exceptional access that is fully
transparent to the public and incurs high social costs making
it impractical as a tool for mass surveillance. We believe that
any proposed exceptional access scheme should be designed,
from the start, to be truly exceptional, i.e., they should only
be useful in the most extreme of cases. For a more in-depth
discussion on the ethical implications of exceptional access
schemes we refer the reader to [49].
1.2 Authors’ Opinions
Considering the controversy surrounding this area of research,
we believe it is important to stress that we, the authors, are not
advocating legislation mandating exceptional access schemes.
We firmly believe that attempts to outlaw strong encryption
are misguided and dangerous. However, we also believe that
the cryptographic research community needs to take this prob-
lem seriously in order to avoid rushed legislation that gives
governments unilateral power to unlock devices. While we are
aware that credible exceptional access research could be used
as a fig leaf to justify backdoors that are secure “in name only,”
recent events show governments are willing to mandate them
regardless of academic research [27, 38, 39]. We hope JJE
can help facilitate a discussion into ethical exceptional access
and to show that there are more secure and more ethical alter-
natives to secretive “backdoors”. We believe that an honest
discussion will strengthen the hand of privacy advocates.
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1.3 Our Contributions
To the best of our knowledge, JJE is the first exceptional
access proposal which is fully decentralized, ensures legal au-
thorities are engaged in the unlock process, and incurs a high
operational cost per device when used by law enforcement. In
addition, using JJE requires a fixed, unavoidable social cost.
Our technical contributions are twofold.
• We present the first decentralized system for providing
exceptional access where accountability is enforced and
social costs are imposed on a per device basis;
• We extensively analyze our system under a realistic
threat model to ensure it does not lend itself as a tool for
mass-surveillance and other forms of abuse.
While we believe that JJE is a novel system for exceptional
access which improves upon the existing proposals, there are
several limitations to JJE which we believe are import to
address upfront.
1.4 Limitations
JJE is one of few academic works rigorously addressing the
problem of exceptional access to locked devices [43, 49]. As
such, JJE is necessarily a starting point for future work in this
area intersecting cryptography, systems, and policy research.
JJE should be viewed as a stepping stone and instigator for
(academic) discussion rather than a perfect “deployable to-
morrow” solution to the multifaceted and complex problem
of exceptional access.
• JJE is designed to be used in a country where there
exists some level of trust in independent legal or non-
government institutions. This may be infeasible in a
totalitarian government.
• JJE requires a secure enclave processor. However, with-
out such hardware it is likely a device could be easily
unlocked by a sophisticated adversary [18,19,29,30,42]
• JJE could present novel legal questions about interna-
tional jurisdiction of locked devices. We discuss how
JJE can handle these issues in Section 7.1. However,
this issue fundamentally arises from denying govern-
ments unilateral authority to unlock devices.
We provide additional discussion on limitations in Section 8.
2 Related Work
Exceptional Access & Key Escrow: There have been only
a few recent works related to exceptional access. The existing
work has either focused on providing law enforcement with
access to encrypted communications or proposing systems
for lawful device unlocking under certain assumptions. Older
work (circa 1995), has been primarily interested in the prob-
lem of key escrow rather than access to locked devices. This
includes work by Bellare and Goldwasser [6, 7, 25] where the
authors describe several different techniques for key escrow
systems, where the trust placed in law enforcement is limited.
At a high level, they proposes different means of providing
a partial secret key to a trusted 3rd party such that after the
partial key is recovered, obtaining the full secret key requires
computational (and monetary) resources with the hope that
such cost would limit mass surveillance.
It is only recently (circa 2018), following the heavily pub-
licized Apple vs. FBI debacle [29], that the community had
revived interest in this esearch area. In 2018, Wright and
Varia [49] propose a scheme for giving law enforcement ac-
cess to encrypted data using time-lock puzzles. Their ap-
proach, in theory, requires law enforcement to expend sig-
nificant monetary resources to break encryption by requir-
ing abundant computing power and upfront costs for pre-
computation. These costs, they claim, can be tuned so that
each intercepted message costs between $1000 and $1M to
crack. Their approach does not involve any technical means
for enforcing transparency or incorporating social costs.
In the same year, Ozzie [40] proposed a system for unlock-
ing devices by placing full trust in the device manufacturer.
While the proposal lacks much technical detail and analy-
sis, the high-level idea is to have the manufacturer act as a
trusted key escrow, acting as an arbiter for the unlock pro-
cess. In the proposed scheme, each device encrypts its own
“master key” with the manufacturer’s public key which can
then be decrypted by the manufacturer in cooperation with
law enforcement to provide access to the device.
Savage [43] expands and formalizes several of Ozzie’s
ideas to propose a similar system for lawful device unlocking
by placing power and trust in the manufacturer’s hands. The
scheme also sets in place several safeguards for preventing
mass unlock capabilities by law enforcement, ensuring post
unlock transparency, and time vaulting. From our perspective,
[43] is most related to JJE, but differs from our approach in
that there are no baked-in guarantees of (public) transparency
and social cost.
Surveillance & Cryptography: Orthogonal to JJE is the
topic of surveillance. Using cryptography for creating ac-
countability in surveillance has been studied in several prior
works. Kroll et al. [31] propose a mechanism for providing
accountability in the court system using secure multi-party
computations to execute warrant requests in a private yet
auditable manner.
Similarly, Bates et al. [5] propose a system for account-
able wiretapping technology with the goal of keeping law
enforcement activity in the public record. This line of work
was followed up more recently by Frankle et al. [23] where
the authors discuss ways in which secret processes can be
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made publicly auditable without compromising secrecy of
law enforcement investigations. The system uses a combina-
tion of zero-knowledge proofs, a tamper-proof ledger, and
multi-party computation to achieve that goal.
Goldwasser et al. [26] describe a cryptographic system for
allowing accountability of secret laws related to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Their solution uses
zero-knowledge proofs to provide public auditing of (secret)
data collection and surveillance procedures.
These works (and many others) provide interesting avenues
for exploring extensions to our system, especially in regards
to providing different levels of accountability and privacy in
exceptional access mechanisms but we do not consider them
to be part of the exceptional access literature.
3 Overview
3.1 Goals
The primary goal of any system designed to give legal ac-
cess to a third party is to avoid abuse and ensure transparent
legal compliance. The concern of backdoors is their poten-
tial for fueling mass surveillance practices by a malicious
government agency, rogue employees, and hackers. Hence,
the foremost priority of designing a lawful access scheme is
to bake in limits on the scheme’s usage at the design level.
Ozzie’s proposal [40] fails to identify this particular risk,
instead relying on the private sector to act as a restrainer.
Stefan Savage, in his technical discussion [43], identifies the
crucial need for imposing clear technical barriers to govern-
ment mass surveillance. However, the proposed system still
requires the private sector to keep the government in check,
albeit to a lesser extent by imposing time-lock mechanisms to
limit covert unlocking capability. We establish the following
desirable properties which we believe a lawful device access
scheme should achieve. We provide a summary of the desired
properties in Table 1.
Authorization: Law enforcement must provide proof-of-
authorization to unlock a device (e.g., a warrant). This is an
imperative first step to avoiding abuse of power; however, it
is not sufficient on its own as seen from numerous historical
precedent [21, 22].
Non-scalability: Individual device access is infeasible to
scale to mass surveillance operations. We can do this by re-
quiring law enforcement to expend a finite resource (e.g.,
physical or monetary) to obtain access. The access mecha-
nism should incur a certain physical cost to law enforcement
and could take the form of officers on the ground or task
force organization on a per device basis. Other forms of phys-
ical costs could include computational or monetary costs, as
proposed in [49].
Social Costs: While non-scalability via physical costs is
important, it is not sufficient on its own. A well funded ad-
versary (e.g., a government agency) can adapt by increasing
its budget or creating specialized task forces. Thus, we ad-
ditionally require social costs — social and political costs
levied through transparency which act as deterrent to mass
surveillance. With both physical and social costs imposed on
the unlock mechanism, the barriers to mass surveillance can
be fine-tuned such that governments are unable to orchestrate
device access operations en masse.
Physical Access: A related goal which serves the purpose
of guaranteeing non-scalability is ensuring that no device
unlock procedure can be instigated remotely. In other words,
physical possession of the device is required to unlock it. We
therefore desire that law enforcement posses the device prior
to being able to issue any aspect of the unlock request. We
propose cryptographic methods that are used in conjunction
with existing hardware to achieve this requirement.
Transparency: Finally, it is crucial to maintain transparency
of the unlock procedure, i.e., there must be some level of pub-
lic awareness to the use of the exceptional access scheme in
order to avoid covert spying. Transparency serves as a deter-
rent to covert mass surveillance since government agencies
can be held accountable for their actions.
3.2 Why Devices and not Encryption
A crucial distinction is that JJE does not affect security of
encryption itself. Much work has been dedicated to arguing
why building backdoors into encryption schemes is simply not
feasible without compromising security at some level [2, 48].
This work does not attempt to refute those claims.
This paper addresses the more reasonable demand of ac-
cessing personal devices that are encrypted by default. We
do not make any attempt to weaken encryption or give law
enforcement access to encrypted communication. However, it
is important to note that in many cases, the information stored
on personal devices contains most of the data law enforcement
may wish to gather on an individual. Encrypted and secure
communication applications such as Signal, WhatsApp, and
iMessage, by default, are secure solely on the premise that
the device on which they are installed is encrypted and locked.
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that with access to personal
devices, law enforcement can obtain access to otherwise en-
crypted data as well.
4 Framework
We are now ready to describe the JJE framework. We begin by
delineating roles and establishing the assumptions we make
in the security model.
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Authorization Non-scalability Physical Access Transparency Social Cost
Identity of the
selected delegation
can only be revealed
by the custodians.
Finite resources must
be expended by law
enforcement to unlock
each device.
Physical possession of
a device is required to
initiate the unlock
process.
All unlock request
require participation
of multiple custodians
and peer devices.
Exceptional access
must incur a social
cost on a per-device
basis.
Table 1: Summary of goals for JJE.
Roles & Threat Model
JJE has four entities which interact together while following
a specified unlock protocol. The entities are Manufacturer,
Custodians, Law Enforcement and Access Delegates. In this
subsection, we describe the role of each entity and the trust
model we assume for each role.
Manufacturer: A device manufacturer is responsible for
ensuring each device produced is designed with hardware that
supports JJE and isn’t compromised at manufacture time. In
the most basic terms, a manufacturer must be trusted to make
devices that have a secure processor that isn’t tampered or
vulnerable to attack.
Threat Model: We assume that the manufacturer is honest-but-
curious, that is, the manufacturer will not actively sabotage the
unlock mechanism to either allow or prevent law enforcement
from accessing a device [29]. This is a necessary assump-
tion to make given that a fully malicious manufacturer can
compromise the hardware, device encryption, and even plant
deliberate software bugs. However, given sufficient advances
in hardware attestation it is possible a manufacture could
prove each device follows JJE and has not been tampered
with [13, 17, 19]. This could allow the manufacture to be
reclassified as malicious under our threat model.
Custodians: A custodian corresponds to an entity in posses-
sion of a (partial) secret key and is fixed at system set up time.
We imagine custodians as servers belonging and operated by
the government itself (e.g., district courts), nonprofit groups,
corporations, or academic institutions. We require a group of
custodians in our system to approve unlock requests issued
by government agencies and law enforcement.
Specifically, custodians are tasked with the role of recog-
nizing legitimate unlock requests issued by law enforcement.
We imagine that organizations acting as custodians have the
legal knowledge and funding to validate court issued subpoe-
nas, and for them to not be easily pressured into cooperation.
Importantly, custodians have the power to approve device
access requests, but not the power to unlock devices.
Threat Model: We model individual custodians as fully-
malicious (i.e., deviating from protocol by collaborating with
law enforcement) but assume that at least one custodian
is honest-but-curious and follows the protocol. Again, this
model captures a real-world expectation of trust placed in
many legal systems and public institutions such as civil rights
groups. It is important to note that JJE may be less practical
in countries without some institutions capable of standing up
to government abuse. We discuss this limitation in Section 8.
Delegates: Delegates are peer devices that collectively have
the power to unlock a single device at a time. A “delegation”
consists of a randomly chosen set peer devices that act as a
type of key escrow. A sufficient coalition of devices from a
delegation can unlock a device. Though we describe the full
technical details in subsequent sections, we stress that JJE
ensures that each device has an independently random and
anonymous delegation consisting of other devices participat-
ing in the protocol. Conceptually, a delegation can be seen as
a “jury” though we do not require delegates to act as “jurors”
in the legal sense. Importantly, we do not expect the owners
of delegate devices to decide what is a lawful or unlawful
request. The purpose of delegate involvement is to ensure a
social cost and enforce transparency of exceptional access.
Threat Model: We assume that any device in a selected del-
egation could be actively malicious. In addition, we expect
some devices to have limited connectivity, others to be lost,
broken, or otherwise not able to cooperate with the protocol.
Our only requirement is that most devices are not physically
compromised by an adversary. We will show that, under a
reasonable parameter selection, as long as no more than some
percentage of all devices (e.g. 25%) are corrupted, the system
is secure from abuse with high probability. We elaborate on
the details of this requirement in Section 6.
Law Enforcement: Law enforcement wish to obtain access
to a locked device. To achieve this, law enforcement interacts
with custodians to obtain approval, and subsequently interact
with delegates within the selected delegation to obtain an
unlock token used for unlocking the device. In the process,
law enforcement will need physical access to all devices in
the delegation in order to obtain the necessary signatures to
unlock a device.
Threat Model: We model law enforcement as fully mali-
cious. Indeed, a large part of the reason for implementing
JJE is to protect law-abiding citizens from corrupted law-
enforcement organizations or rogue officers within an agency.
Moreover, any malicious adversary such as state sponsored
hackers would be equivalent under JJE to rogue law enforce-
ment attempting to (unlawfully) access the device.
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4.1 Assumptions
With the roles and threat model established, we now turn to
the assumptions that we make in realizing JJE. We make
three assumptions which serve as a foundation for construct-
ing the framework. We are careful to justify our trust model
based on current real world security assumptions made in
practice. Moreover, these assumptions would be required by
any practical unlock system, not just JJE.
Assumption 1. We assume that tamper-reistant, secure en-
claves exists and are free of vulnerabilities.
Justification: A device is only as secure as its password.
While it is possible to encrypt a device directly, it is impracti-
cal for most users to memorize a full encryption key. Some
modern devices maintain state of the art security against phys-
ical attack by using secure enclave co-processors which only
run software that has been cryptographically signed by its
manufacturer in order to gate access to the true decryption
key of the device [3, 4]. Indeed, without dedicated tamper
resistant hardware, an adversary can be assumed to have the
capability of unlocking a device via a brute-force attack, for
example. Because of this, we believe that any exceptional
access scheme would be trivially insecure without this re-
quirement.
It is important to note that the term “secure enclave” has a
somewhat overloaded definition. There have been a number of
works describing creative attacks on secure processors which
allow execution of arbitrary user code, specifically the recent
SGX processor developed by Intel [32, 45, 46]. However, in
JJE it is sufficient for devices to run dedicated software de-
signed by the manufacture at device creation time such as a
TPM [3, 13]. This is the model used by iPhones, Macs and
some Android phones [3, 4] and is suspected to be difficult
to break [29]. Furthermore, recent work has developed for-
mal guarantees for enclave processors, making them more
resilient to attacks [18].
Assumption 2. We assume that the only two ways to unlock
a device is through the intended mechanism (i.e., by providing
a password) and the JJE exceptional access scheme.
Justification: In other words, we do not claim that JJE
fixes other methods of breaking into a device. Therefore for
our security analysis we exclude the possibility of breaking
into the device via side-channels and zero-day vulnerabilities.
While in the real world this is certainly not assured, such
methods for accessing devices are tangential to the usefulness
of JJE.
Assumption 3. We assume that only devices honestly follow-
ing the protocol can be unlocked using the JJE exceptional
access protocol.
Justification: It is impossible to stop a device from further-
ing its own security given a savvy and determined user. For
instance, a user can always encrypt important files using a
second layer of encryption which JJE would not provide ac-
cess to. Moreover, a user could trivially wipe the preinstalled
operating system and use their own system which does not
participate in JJE. We discuss practical means of incentiviz-
ing cooperation in Section 7.2.
4.2 Strawman Proposal
With the necessary context and assumptions in place, we are
now ready to describe an initial attempt at a solution which ad-
dresses the aforementioned design goals. The JJE framework
is divided into four stages which we outline below.
Initial Setup: For simplicity of presentation, assume a set of
custodians have among them shares of a secret key skC such
that they can collectively decrypt a ciphertext encrypted under
a public key pkC and sign signatures which verify under a
public verification key vkC .
Device Setup: Each manufactured device uses its secure pro-
cessor to generates a public verification key vkD along with
a secret signing key skD . The secret key skD is stored on the
device using secure sealed storage1, managed by the device’s
secure processor. The public verification key is published to
a public list L maintained by the custodians along with a
unique device identifier that can be used to physically track
down a device.
Device Protocol: Each device selects a randomly chosen
subset Σ of verification keys from L and samples a random
nonce α. To ensure that custodians are required to approve
exceptional access requests, the device encrypts the entire
set of verification keys it selected using the public key pkC .
Recall that custodians hold the corresponding shares of the
secret key skC . The device then outputs the challenge chal :=
EncpkC (Σ||α) consisting of the encrypted selection along with
the nonce. For the sake of the strawman argument, we assume
that the device is equipped with a read-only mailbox interface
accessible via hardware pins [3], which is used exclusively
for interfacing with JJE, and which enables law enforcement
to read chal given physical possession of to the device.
Exceptional Access Protocol: If law enforcement has phys-
ical access to a device, they can read the challenge chal from
the enclave via the secure mailbox interface. Law enforce-
ment then requests the custodians to decrypt [Σ||α] , which,
if they agree, allows law enforcement to recover the set of
delegate identities selected by the device. Law enforcement
then uses the identifying information stored in L to locate
the devices selected in Σ. For each device in the set, law en-
forcement requests that the delegate device to sign the nonce
1For an example see https://developer.apple.com/
documentation/security/certificate_key_and_trust_services/
keys/storing_keys_in_the_secure_enclave for details.
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Figure 1: Overview of JJE protocol and interaction steps necessary to unlock a device. (1) manufactured devices upload a public
signature key and encrypted identifier to the delegate list. (2) When an unlock request is issued by law enforcement, the (locked)
device selects a random set of indices from the list of delegates which becomes its unlock challenge. (3) Law enforcement
requests the identities of the devices located at indices selected by the device. (4) Law enforcement locates the delegates and
obtains a set of signatures which are the key to unlocking the device.
α (output as part of the challenge chal by the locked device).
Call this set of delegate signatures on the nonce Γ.
The locked device, when presented with Γ, locally verifies
that the signatures are valid (and match its selection Σ). If the
check verifies, the device outputs an access token φ which
allows law enforcement to unlock the device.
——————————
The high-level strawman solution satisfies the design goals
outlined above. Specifically, 1) authorization is satisfied given
that custodians must agree to decrypt the challenge and reveal
the identity of the selected delegation; 2) Non-scalability is
achieved by the fact that each device that law enforcement
needs unlocked requires a unique challenge making the un-
lock protocol effective only on a per device basis; 3) the
physical access requirement is achieved by writing the access
challenge to a read-only hardware interface; 4) transparency
is achieved by requiring the involvement of both custodians
and randomly chosen set of delegate devices; 5) social costs
are incurred by the need for Law Enforcement to locate a
randomly chosen delegation, on a per device basis.
Problems with Strawman: While the strawman solution
described above does achieve the desired properties of Sec-
tion 3, there are technical questions that must be addressed
and fleshed out. Specifically, how is the list L of peer device
keys maintained and how does each device obtain it? How
do we prevent an adversary from inserting malicious delegate
keys into the list? How do we ensure that devices chosen
in the delegation are active (i.e., not lost or broken) and can
be located? Finally, given the physical access requirement,
how can the protocol function well in practice if devices are
spread across the world? For example, if a device is seized in
San Francisco, California, can it securely select a delegation
consisting of devices located in, say, the West Coast of the
United States? We address all these questions in the following
sections.
5 The JJE Scheme
In this section, we describe the necessary protocols for realiz-
ing JJE and address the problems described in the strawman
scheme. To do so, we must introduce some necessary crypto-
graphic and hardware security building blocks we use in our
construction.
5.1 Cryptographic Building Blocks
Secure Processors: Secure processors such as Apple’s T2
Chip [3] used in iPhones and MacBooks, and Google’s Ti-
tan M Chip for high end Android phones [4], are becoming
increasingly prevalent in smartphones and computers alike.
Such processors enable computations to run securely on the
device, isolated from other device components. This enables
secure computation even in the presence of adversarial soft-
ware on the device [18, 19, 42]. What’s more, this family of
processors are resilient to both hardware and software attacks
and engineered to be tamper-resistant [18, 19, 42]. For ease of
presentation, we describe our protocol using Apple’s T2 ter-
minology, and we make use of Assumption 1 that the secure
processor on the device is secure.
Cryptographic Signatures: We require a cryptographic sig-
nature scheme [20, 28] for the purpose of verifying different
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Relevant Notation
Symbol Description
IMEI unique IMEI of a device (see Section 5.2).
L set of delegate public keys and encrypted
IMEIs.
N number of delegate devices in the current
epoch.
m number of devices in a delegation.
n number of custodians in the system.
vkE digital signature verification key of entity E .
σE (·) signature under the signing key of entity E .
pkE public encryption key of entity E .
[v] encryption of a value v.
M device manufacturer.
D a delegate device in the system.
D the locked device which law enforcement wants
to access.
entities in the system. We also require group signatures [10],
where a set of entities can generate a signature using shares
of a secret key, such that the signature can be verified by a
single public key.
We denote a signature issued by an entity E in the system
by σE (m) where m is the message being signed. Anyone can
verify the signature σE (m) using the public verification key
vkE .
Merkle Trees: We use Merkle trees [34, 35] to efficiently
validate entries in a list. A Merkle tree consists of three al-
gorithms: MerkleHash, MerklePath, and MerkleVer. A list
of values is hashed using MerkleHash which outputs a suc-
cinct “root hash” of the entire list. A proof that an element is
contained in the list can be issued using MerklePath which
takes as input an entry from the hashed list and outputs a list
of hashes that form a path from the root hash to the entry.
The proof can be verified efficiently using MerkleVer which
outputs 1 if it is given a valid path and 0 otherwise (i.e., if the
element is not in the list). Importantly the size of the proof is
logarithmic in the size of the list.
5.2 International Mobile Equipment Identity
(IMEI)
An IMEI is a unique 15-digit identifier used to identify all
mobile phones. The IMEI is a device specific identifier that is
independent of the operating system and cellular network [41,
44]. All devices in a cellular network share their IMEI number
with the cellular network provider (e.g., AT&T) which links
it to an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) [41,
44]. In this work, we use the fact that network providers
know the (IMEI, IMSI) pair for each device in their network
and can therefore provide information about the subscriber
(i.e., device owner) based on the IMEI. For simplicity, we
assume that law enforcement already has efficient means to
access these records. This is a reasonable requirement in
practicegiven that the network provider already has the ability
to blacklist devices based on the IMEI (e.g., if a device is
stolen, etc.) [41, 44].
5.3 Epochs
In order to ensure that most devices in L are operational and
that new devices can be added, JJE is broken into sequential
epochs τ ∈ {0,1 . . .}. Each epoch last for some fix amount of
time which could be on the order of a week or a month.
During an epoch devices will update themselves to the
current list Lτ and select delegates from that list. If a device
is issued an unlock request it will use the most recent epoch
that it has updated to. A device does not need to be on the
current epoch if the device has yet to update. Moreover, it is
acceptable to have some devices miss epochs due to network
failures, power loss, or any number of other reasons.
During epoch τ, devices will register themselves for the
next epoch τ+1. At the end of epoch τ, the custodians will
publish a new list Lτ+1 using all devices that have registered
during the last epoch. This way each device only needs net-
work access at some point during an epoch.
For notational simplicity, we drop the τ subscript and de-
note the number of devices in the current epoch by N and the
list of delegates by L .
5.4 Custodian Setup
The set of custodians run a Distributed Key Generation (DKG)
protocol [12,24] to obtain a public encryption and verification
keys (pkk,vkC ) such that each custodian holds a share of the
secret key skC .
Custodians collectively maintain a list of delegates L to
which devices can add themselves. Custodians initialize the
first epoch τ= 0 via the CustodianConsensus protocol.
5.5 Manufacturer Setup
We split manufacturer setup into two protocols:
SystemSetup and DeviceSetup. The former is used to
initialize the system once (i.e., when the manufacturer begins
operations), the latter protocol is used to initialize each new
manufactured device.
SystemSetup: The manufacturer generates a key pair
(vkM ,skM ) for a cryptographic signature scheme. The public
verification key vkM is made available to all entities in JJE.
We note that, in many cases, this setup is already in place as
it is needed for manufacturers to sign software updates [36].
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Therefore, JJE can be setup on the manufacturer sideusing
existing code-signing infrastructure. The manufacturer signs
the generated public keys of the custodians, pkC and vkC ,
which it outputs to all entities in JJE.
DeviceSetup: For each manufactured device, the manufac-
turer interfaces with the device’s secure processor via a des-
ignated API to request the generation of a new signature key
pair. The secure processor generates and stores the secret key
skD in sealed storage2 and outputs the corresponding public
verification key vkD via the secure processor interface. The
manufacturer signs the device’s public key to generate a sig-
nature σM (vkD) which it sends back to the device’s secure
processor. This signature is subsequently used by the device
to prove that it is real device (built by the manufacturer) and
not a virtual sybil masquerading as a delegate. This process
is analogous to existing methods for hardware attestation and
widely available at scale [3, 13, 18, 19].
5.6 Custodian Protocol
Over the duration of epoch τ − 1, custodians accept
DelegateIDDs from devices. At the end of epoch τ− 1,
custodians collectively perform CustodianConsensus() to
start a new epoch τ.
CustodianConsensus: At the start of epoch τ each custodian
has received some number of DelegateIDDs from devices.
Each custodian then validates each DelegateIDD by ensuring
it is signed by the manufacture and is not a duplicate. It then
generates a prospective list L˜τ of all valid, non-duplicate de-
vices. Each custodian then send its prospective list to every
other custodian. Custodians validate every prospective list
generated by all other custodians. Finally, custodians collec-
tively publish the union of all valid devices from each L˜τ as
Lτ and collectively sign it. Additionally they publish and sign
a small metadata header:
H := (MerkleHash(Lτ)||Nτ||τ)
consisting of the root Merkle hash, the number of devices in
the epoch, and the current epoch number.
If at least one custodian does not agree on the collective
pick for Lτ, then everyone aborts the procedure and publishes
its chosen list. This output can be used as a proof of whether
a custodian has attempted to publish a non valid list. Note,
that if a malicious custodian chooses to abort the procedure it
simply stops the creation of a new epoch. JJE will still be as
secure as the last epoch τ−1.
2Secure encrypted storage managed by the enclave – skD never leaves
the enclave and remains unknown to the manufacturer.
5.7 Device Protocols
We denote by D the locked device which law enforcement
wants to access. All delegate devices are denoted byD . Every
device must do the following two things: (1) it must make
itself “available” as a delegate and (2) it must be able to
“approve” unlock requests for other devices that have selected
it to be part of a delegation. We require a protocol by which
each device can share some identifying information which
can only be revealed by a coalition of custodians. Next, we
require a protocol for a locked device to securely select a set
of delegates without risking man-in-the-middle attacks and
without leaking the delegation identity in the process. Finally,
we require an unlocking protocol by which the locked device
reveals a unique access token φ, such as the password, used
to unlock it.
We split these three separate functionalities into the
following protocols: DelegateRegister, SelectDelegation
and RevealUnlockToken.
D .DelegateRegister(): The device D generates a fresh
key pair (vkD ,skD) and encrypts its own IMEI number us-
ing the public key of the custodians to obtain [IMEI] :=
EncpkC (IMEI). The device then generates the tuple
DelegateIDD := (vkD , [IMEI] )
and proceeds to write DelegateIDD to L by sending
DelegateIDD to each custodian over a secure channel.
D .SelectDelegation(H): The device downloads the signed
header H of the most recent Lτ. Recall
H := (MerkleHash(L)||N||τ)
The device verifies the header signature using vkC . It then
selects indices `1, `2, . . . , `m uniformly at random such that
1≤ `i ≤ N, where N is the size of L . Let Σ= {`1, . . . , `m} be
a set of indices which the device stores in secure memory.
This delegate selection does not leave the device.
D .RevealChallenge(): The locked device D generates
a random nonce α and encrypts its selection of delegates
along with the nonce under the custodian’s encryption key
[Σ||α] := EncpkC (Σ||α), and outputs the challenge
chal := [Σ||α]
via the enclaves’s secure mailbox interface. This protocol
is only used if a device is attempted to be unlocked via
JJE. Once a device outputs an unlock challenge, it should
not update to new epochs for some fixed period to ensure
reasonable time to complete the request.
D .SignRequest(α): The delegate device D signs the input
nonce and sends back σD(α) through the secure hardware
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mailbox interface. This process allows law enforcement to
obtain the necessary signatures from delegate devices without
compromising the security and privacy of delegates.
D .RevealUnlockToken(Γ,Π): When given the set Γ =
{ j||DelegateIDD j ||σD j(α) | j ∈ Σ} consisting of verification
keys (recall that DelegateIDD := (vkD , [IMEI] )) and signa-
tures obtained from a subset of delegate devices in L , indexed
by the set Σ, and Π = {pi1, . . . ,pi|Γ|} consisting of a set of
Merkle proofs for each delegate verification key, the device
verifies the following:
(1) |Γ| ≥ t where t is the threshold of signatures required for
unlocking;
(2) MerkleVer(pi j,DelegateIDD j || j) = 1 for each element
in Γ;
(3) For each signature σD j(α) ∈ Γ, the corresponding verifi-
cation key vkD j verifies the signature.
The verifications ensure that a sufficient coalition of devices
from the delegate selection signed the unlock request and, cru-
cially, that each signature obtained was from delegate device
indexed by the set Σ in L . This latter step ensures that the
delegation selection was not “swapped out” for a selection
Σ∗ 6= Σ.
If the three verification steps pass, D reveals the unlock
token3 φ by writing it to the secure mailbox interface. Other-
wise, the unlock process fails and D outputs ⊥.
5.8 Delegate Protocol
To participate in the system as a delegate, a device D must
add itself to the list of participating devices. For each new
time epoch, D runs DelegateRegister to add itself to the list
L and makes itself available for selection.
Devices can be called upon as delegates in order to verify
the unlock of other devices through the SignRequest proto-
col. We stress that the process by which an owner of a delegate
devices signs a nonce should be non-invasive. Specifically,
there is no need for a device owner in a delegation to unlock
their own device (which is acting as a delegate) in order to
sign a request. The signature can be obtained by interfacing
directly with the device’s enclave through a physical pin con-
nection or wirelessly using built in RFID. However, physical
access by law enforcement is needed both to incur a social
cost and to reduce the risk of side channel attacks but partici-
pation should not incur an invasion of privacy for the delegate
device owner.
3The token φ can be as simple as the device’s password.
5.9 Warranted Access Protocol
We will now describe how law enforcement proceeds to
unlock a device through JJE. We assume that law enforce-
ment has physical access to D so that they can interface
with the secure processor over a mailbox interface [18]. Law
enforcement proceeds as follows:
Step 1: Law enforcement sends a request to the secure hard-
ware enclave via RevealChallenge and obtains the challenge
chal := [Σ||α] .
Step 2: Law enforcement now presents chal to the custo-
dians. The custodians decrypt [Σ||α] and reveal the IMEI
numbers of the selected delegation by decrypting the entries
in L indexed by Σ. Recall that the ith entry in L is of the form
L [i] = (vki||[IMEIDi ] ||i). The custodians output the set
I := {IMEID j | j ∈ Σ}
Step 3: Law enforcement now has the IMEI numbers, which
uniquely identify each device in the delegation. Law enforce-
ment is now responsible for physically locating devices in
I to obtain a signature. To prove that the selected delegate
verification keys in I are correct (i.e., are indeed the keys in
L indexed by Σ), law enforcement generates a set of Merkle
proofs,
Π= {MerklePath(L [ j]) | j ∈ Σ}
where L [ j] is the element at the jth index of L .
Step 4: Law enforcement needs to locate at least t devices in
the set. For each delegate device that law enforcement locates,
they interface with the secure hardware mailbox interface to
send α to the device. The delegate device responds according
to SignRequest. Define the set of all t delegate verification
keys and signatures of the nonce
Γ= {i||DelegateIDDi ||σDi(α) | for i ∈ Σ}.
Step 5: Law enforcement then sends (Γ,Π) to D in response
to the challenge chal. D verifies the correctness of the
response according to D .RevealUnlockToken(Γ,Π).
6 Security & Privacy
In this section we analyze the security properties of JJE in
relation to our threat model. We then address several privacy
concerns which are important to consider in a practical sys-
tem.
6.1 Security Analysis
We present the main theorems we use to prove security in this
section but defer the proofs to Appendix A.
Definition 1. An active device for an epoch τ is a device
which successfully transmits its public key to at least one
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honest custodian. JJE assumes that a sufficient number of
devices will be active for each epoch even if many devices
are not. See Section 6.2
Definition 2. An honest custodian or device is one which
correctly follows the protocol defined in Section 5 and which
is not corrupted by an adversary.
Theorem 1. Assume a secure public key infrastructure
and that at least one custodian is honest. The procedure
CustodianConsensus for epoch τ will either abort or result
in a published list Lτ and root hash Hτ which contains entries
from each honest active device and only entries from devices
signed by the manufacturer M .
Lemma 1. Let D be an honest device with delegation selec-
tion Στ ⊆ Lτ for epoch τ. Then, for all PPT adversaries A if
there is at least one honest custodian,A cannot recover Σ with
probability non-negligibly better than random guessing.
Lemma 2. Suppose Theorem 1 holds for Lτ in epoch τ. Let
D be a device with delegate selection Στ ⊆ Lτ and which has
downloaded the header Hτ of the epoch. Then for all PPT
adversaries A without access to {ski | i ∈ Σ}, the probability
that A can unlock D using JJE is negligible in the security
parameter of the signature scheme.
Lemma 3. Suppose Theorem 1 holds for Lτ in epoch τ. Let
N = |Lτ|, Στ be the delegate selection of a device and A be a
PPT adversary. Suppose A has corrupted at most C ∈ (0,N)
devices.
Then, for any probability p ∈ (0,1), there exists a delega-
tion size m and threshold t such that the probability that A
has corrupted every device in Στ is less than p.
Theorem 2. Suppose Theorem 1 holds for Lτ in epoch τ. Let
A be a PPT adversary and N = |Lτ|.
Suppose A has corrupted at most C ∈ (0,N) devices. Let
D be a device for which A is then given a decrypted chal
(for instance from the custodians) after having selected de-
vices to corrupt. For any p ∈ (0,1) there exists a delegation
size m and threshold t such that for every such D there is an
independent probability bounded by p that A can unlock D
using JJE without cooperation of an honest delegate.
Privacy Analysis: It is also important to show that reason-
able privacy for devices is maintained by JJE. Recall that the
ith entry of the list L , denoted DelegateIDi, is
DelegateIDi := (vki, [IMEIDi ] )
and corresponds to some ith delegate device Di. Each vki is
freshly generated for each new epoch and the publicly iden-
tifiable information (the IMEIDi value) is encrypted under
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Figure 2: The probability that an adversary will have access to
all needed delegate keys given the percentage of all devices it
controls in the current epoch. Each curve represents a different
threshold of key shares needed for the exceptional access
scheme.
the custodians threshold scheme. It is reasonable, however,
to assume that a sophisticated adversary could link device
identities to L entires through network traffic analysis. This,
however, does not compromise the security of the scheme for
honest devices by Lemma 1 and only leaks that a particular
device is participating in JJE.
6.2 Practical Security and Concerns
While our proofs of security provide necessary guarantees,
there are practical concerns that should be addressed.
Partial Epoch Participation: Devices may miss epochs due
to having limited network access, no power, or for any number
of other reasons. However, as long as most devices participate
in an epoch τ, the size of L will be sufficient for security. The
list L for each epoch can be maintained by the custodians and
each device can maintain its old verification keys. Devices
which have not updated to new epochs can be unlocked using
JJE and the header of the last valid epoch.
Lost or Uncooperative Delegate devices: For JJE to be
effective, it needs to work even if devices on the selected del-
egation are lost, broken, out of the country or uncooperative.
In JJE, we fix a threshold t of m signatures needed for unlock-
ing. Law enforcement needs only to access some t devices
to proceed with an unlock request. Therefore, even if m− t
devices are inaccessible, the unlock protocol is able to com-
plete successfully. Additionally, JJE refreshes the delegation
of devices for each epoch (e.g., on a weekly basis), therefore
new delegations are comprised only of active devices.
Practical Levels of Corrupted Devices: We show in Theo-
rem 2 that JJE can be constructed so that probability of an
adversary possessing the needed signatures for a single de-
vice is arbitrarily small. However, we need to show that this
is secure even given practical values for the parameters t and
m.
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Assuming a device choses its delegation of devices uni-
formly at random, the probability that an adversary will pos-
sess all keys in a delegation is the sum of the probability that
it will possess exactly i≥ t shares multiplied by the number
of combinations it can achieve this in. Formally,
p =
m
∑
i=t
(
m
i
)(
C
N
)i(
1− C
N
)m−i
(1)
We plot Equation 1 in Figure 2 for five values of m and t. This
is the probability that an adversary can unlock an arbitrary
honest device given it controls some percent of all devices.
We stress that this success probability is independent for each
device (e.g. being able to unlock a specific device does not
help an adversary unlock other devices). For reasonable pa-
rameters, such as m= 18 and t = 12, we obtain p< 0.01 even
when the adversary controls 35% of all devices. For more con-
servative values, such as 15% of all devices being corrupted,
we obtain a probability of p < 10−6 which is roughly the
same as guessing a 6 digit pin code.
Replay Attacks: When the device generates its unlock chal
through RevealUnlockToken it creates a devices specific ran-
dom nonce α. This nonce is signed by each delegate to com-
plete the unlock challenge. In practice, delegate signatures
cannot be reused by law enforcement to unlock other devices
with different nonces. In our security analysis in Section 6.1;
however, we assume that once a device has been corrupted
the adversary can use it to sign new requests.
6.3 Auditing
An advantage of JJE is that both the manufacturer and custo-
dians can be audited by one another and by the public. This
helps ensure that JJE is being correctly carried out in practice
by quickly revealing anomalous behavior.
Auditing Manufacturers: Under our threat model we as-
sume that a device’s manufacture needs to be honest-but-
curious, otherwise the device itself could be built in a compro-
mised manner via a supply chain attack. It’s possible, however,
that the manufacture could be coerced into malicious partici-
pation with an adversary after building a device.
A malicious manufacturer could perform a sybil attack by
flooding the system with sybil devices under an adversary’s
control. Since manufacturers validate the device keys they
could take over an arbitrary percentage of all devices. How-
ever, the number of devices in JJE is public knowledge and
collectively the custodians have the power to approve the
list L . Any public auditor observing the resulting L for each
epoch would be able to discover a significant spike in new
devices. Since an adversary must control a large number of
all devices, we believe even with a malicious manufacturer
it would be difficult for such an attack to succeed without
notice.
Auditing Custodians: Likewise, devices and the public can
verify that the custodians are correctly carrying out JJE. The
Merkle hash of L guarantees that the correct public keys are
used during unlocking. Since L is public, however, any device
can additionally verify that its key has been added to L .
6.4 Privacy and Transparency
There are two crucial sides to consider when analyzing the
privacy properties of JJE: privacy of delegate devices (and
the people that own the devices) and the transparency of the
exceptional access use.
Delegation Privacy: The privacy of delegates is maintained
by only having public keys stored inL while all other uniquely
identifying information (such as the IMEI number) remains
encrypted and only accessible via consensus of the custodians.
A delegate obtains no information about the identity of the
device being unlocked only that they were selected as one of
its delegates.
However, JJE does require law enforcement to contact
delegates in order unlock a device. We argue that this very
real inconvenience is a feature and not a bug. Using JJE
requires law enforcement to pay this social cost. Every use
of JJE fundamentally must leak the use of exceptional access
to ordinary citizens. If use of the exceptional access scheme
were to be frequent, then it is perhaps good that citizens would
be aware and discomforted by this abuse of power.
Moreover, being called to serve on a traditional jury is al-
ready an accepted social responsibility in many democracies.
One can view participation in JJE as an extension of jury
duty in the digital sphere. Additionally, delegate devices can
be requested to provide a digital signature without unlock-
ing or exposing personal information to law enforcement, as
explained in Section 4.
Law Enforcement Privacy: Public information pertaining
to on-going cases could severely impede investigation for law
enforcement [23]. JJE reveals nothing more than the fact that
some device is being unlocked meaning that law enforcement
secrecy is maintained.
7 Extensions
7.1 International Jurisdiction
JJE could present difficult international jurisdiction issues if
it were to be implemented in multiple countries. Suppose a de-
vice sold in the US was confiscated in Australia. If Australian
authorities request device access they would need physical
access to a number of American delegates. This could result
in complicated legal questions.
A simple solution is to have devices update themselves
each epoch to the local Llocal based on geolocation. This
does not completely solve the problem, but it could mitigate
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it. Additionally, it reduces the number of devices that are
inaccessible due to international travel.
A more complete solution would be to allow any jurisdic-
tion to unlock any device it has physical access to. There is
a danger this would make it easier for international law en-
forcement to unlock devices, but this could also be desirable.
Custodians could maintain a seperate L for each jurisdiction.
Additionally, they publish a single Merkle root hash of the
union of all L’s. Instead of selecting random indices from a
single L , devices select a random seed. When law enforce-
ment query RevealUnlockToken they present the root hash
of the subtree defined by the L of their jurisdiction. The in-
dices of the device’s delegation are defined by the seed and a
predefined fixed pseudo-random generator. This way indices
can be chosen randomly from any L and each jurisdiction has
a valid delegation.
7.2 Incentivizing JJE Participation
As mentioned in Assumption 3, it is impossible to force a
device to cooperate with any exceptional access scheme. For
instance, a user could always use a second layer of strong
encryption. In practice, however, the secure processor is the
only means to pair strong physical security with ease of use [3,
18, 46, 47]. Directly encrypting the device requires the user
to memorize or store a full encryption key which is often
impractical.
Modern devices using a secure hardware enclave often use
a mechanism such as a pin code or biometric to decrypt the
device while maintaining state-of-the-art security [3]. JJE can
therefore tie the use of the secure processor with participation.
Every part of JJE that happens on a device happens in its
secure enclave. As long as the enclave verifies that it continues
to receive valid headers for lists Lτ, for each new epoch τ, it
can be unlocked using JJE. Likewise, the enclave can verify
that its writes are received by the custodians and that it is
successfully contributing its delegate verification keys. If the
enclave fails to update to a new epoch, it can continue to
provide JJE exceptional access on the last valid epoch.
If too much time passes since the last updated epoch and
the device’s password has been correctly used during that
time, then the secure enclave can provide a failsafe where any
valid unlock request signed by the custodians will unlock the
device. This timeout period can be set to be a reasonably long
period of time (such as six months) to incentivize devices to
participate.
8 Limitations
We believe that JJE is a significant advancement compared to
previously proposed exceptional access schemes, especially
when it comes to reducing trust in any single authority and
mitigating the risk of abuse. However, we are under no il-
lusion that JJE is capable or solving all security, practical
or ethical problems resulting from deploying exceptional ac-
cess. We discuss a few important, but by no means exhaustive,
limitations to JJE and other similar systems.
Necessary Political Infrastructure: In order for JJE to op-
erate, there needs to be reasonable trust in public institutions
selected as custodians and public accountability of the gov-
ernment. JJE rests on the assumption that it would be difficult
for abusive law enforcement to secretively coerce all custo-
dians or to routinely silence citizens selected as delegates.
This is certainly not true in all countries especially countries
with authoritarian or unstable governments. In these situations
implementing JJE is likely unsuitable.
Jurisdiction of JJE: Today, most devices are designed
and assembled in supply chains that cross international bor-
ders [15]. Additionally, a handful of large corporations under
the jurisdiction of a few powerful countries build and sell
devices across the entire world [33]. Consider a device which
participates in JJE, but the custodians and most other peer
devices resided in another country. Attempting to unlock a
device using JJE could result in complicated legal questions
of international sovereignty. We discuss potential solutions in
Section 7.1.
Normalization of Exceptional Access: If a country were to
adopt an ethically designed exceptional access scheme such
as JJE, it could provide cover for less judicious countries to
employ insidious backdoors with claims of false equivalence.
Additionally, if citizens objected to participating as delegates
in JJE, dishonest actors might call to remove the delegate
requirement (thereby undermining the entire system), rather
than be pressured into reducing the use of exceptional ac-
cess. We discuss the broader ethics of researching exceptional
access in Section 1.
9 Conclusion
JJE is the first exceptional access scheme which does not
place approval for unlocks in a single trusted authority, but
rather in the hands of devices participating in the scheme.
We show that JJE provides strong security and is resistant
to abuse for mass surveillance by tying unlocks to a social
cost. We present a feasible outline of how JJE could be im-
plemented in practice and rigorously analyze the security of
the protocol. We hope that the ideas presented in this paper
will spur discussion on what exceptional access schemes are
possible and deemed appropriate by society.
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A Proofs
Theorem 1. Assume a secure public key infrastructure
and that at least one custodian is honest. The procedure
CustodianConsensus for epoch τ will either abort or result
in a published list Lτ and root hash Hτ which contains entries
from each honest active device and only entries from devices
signed by the manufacturer M .
Proof. Let D be an active and honest device with
DelegateIDD . Since D is honest, DelegateIDD has been
signed by the manufacture M . Since D is an active device,
it will have sent DelegateIDD to some honest custodian C by
assumption.
Suppose CustodianConsensus does not abort. The hon-
est custodian C will validate DelegateIDD and include it in
its prospective list L˜τ. Since the procedure does not abort
DelegateIDD must be included in the final consensus list Lτ.
Let K be some entry in the final Lτ. Since the procedure
did not abort, the honest custodian C must have validated the
list. Therefore, K has been signed by M which concludes the
proof.
Lemma 1. Let D be an honest device with delegation selec-
tion Στ ⊆ Lτ for epoch τ. Then, for all PPT adversaries A if
there is at least one honest custodian,A cannot recover Σ with
probability non-negligibly better than random guessing.
Proof. No witness to the selection of Σ leaves the device
until the hardware protocolD .RevealChallenge() is initiated.
Furthermore, only EncpkC (Σ||α) is returned. Since there is at
least one honest custodian, the adversary cannot possess every
share needed to decrypt [Σ||α] . Therefore, A cannot decrypt
[Σ||α] with better than negligible probability by property of
public key encryption schemes.
Additionally, by construction, each device selects Σ uni-
formly and independently at random. By Assumption 1, this
selection by the secure processor cannot be inferred. There-
fore, A cannot recover Σ with probability that is better than
random guessing.
Lemma 2. Suppose Theorem 1 holds for Lτ in epoch τ. Let
D be a device with delegate selection Στ ⊆ Lτ and which has
downloaded the header Hτ of the epoch. Then for all PPT
adversaries A without access to {ski | i ∈ Σ}, the probability
that A can unlock D using JJE is negligible in the security
parameter of the signature scheme.
Proof. Since Theorem 1 holds for τ, the MerkleProof Πτ is
signed by the custodians and can be verified by D using the
header H signed by the custodians. The custodian’s signature
has a root of trust originating from M ’s signature during the
initial custodian setup.
The only means to unlock D through JJE is through the
D .RevealUnlockToken(Γ,Π) protocol. Recall
Γ= { j||DelegateIDD j ||σD j(α) | j ∈ Σ}
and Π is a set of Merkle proofs verifying that vkD j is at index
j in L for all j ∈ Σ. The proofs Πτ can be verified via the
Merkle hash in Hτ that D has downloaded for epoch τ.
This input is required by the secure enclave in order to
unlock. Suppose the adversary could generate this input with-
out access to all of the secret keys {ski | i ∈ Σ} belonging
to the delegate devices. The adversary must then be able to
either forge the signatures σi or fabricate the Merkle proofs
M. We assume this only happens with negligible probabil-
ity [20, 28, 34].
Lemma 3. Suppose Theorem 1 holds for Lτ in epoch τ. Let
N = |Lτ|, Στ be the delegate selection of a device and A be a
PPT adversary. Suppose A has corrupted at most C ∈ (0,N)
devices.
Then, for any probability p ∈ (0,1), there exists a delega-
tion size m and threshold t such that the probability that A
has corrupted every device in Στ is less than p.
Proof. Suppose the adversary corrupts some set R of devices
with |R | = C. By construction, each non corrupted honest
device selects its delegation indices Σ such that |Σ|= m uni-
formly at random and independently from all other devices.
Let t = m. Since the indices are chosen uniformly at random
no mater how the adversary selects R , the probability that
the adversary possess at least t devices on D’s delegation is
bounded by (
C
N
)m
(2)
when m ≤ C and is 0 when m > C. We must therefore be
able to select m such that
(C
N
)m
< p. In practice, the full
probability is exponentially small with reasonable choices for
m and t. See Section 6.2 for analysis of practical choices of
parameters.
Theorem 2. Suppose Theorem 1 holds for Lτ in epoch τ. Let
A be a PPT adversary and N = |Lτ|.
Suppose A has corrupted at most C ∈ (0,N) devices. Let
D be a device for which A is then given a decrypted chal
(for instance from the custodians) after having selected de-
vices to corrupt. For any p ∈ (0,1) there exists a delegation
size m and threshold t such that for every such D there is an
independent probability bounded by p that A can unlock D
using JJE without cooperation of an honest delegate.
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Proof. Let D be an honest uncorrupted device. Suppose A
corrupts some set of R devices with |R |=C.
By Lemma 1, no matter which other devices the adversary
has chosen to corrupt, the adversary cannot select a device on
D’s choice of delegation Σ with better than random chance.
By Lemma 2, the adversary must corrupt all delegate devices
in Σ. By Lemma 3 there exists some m such that adversary
will not have corrupted all of Σ with probability less than p.
Now suppose A is is given the decryption to chal after hav-
ing selected R . With delegation size m the adversary needs to
corrupt at least one additional honest device with probability
1− p.
B Additional Extensions
B.1 Incorporating Time-lock Mechanisms
One of the goals outlined of the exceptional access mecha-
nism described in [43] is to impose a time-lock mechanism
to require a certain amount of time (e.g., 3 days [43]) before
giving law enforcement the ability to proceed with the un-
lock protocol. In theory, such a mechanism would mitigate
the effectiveness of a “device swap” attack (e.g., where the
target is away from the phone for a weekend). However, upon
careful consideration, we do not believe such a mechanism
would be an effective deterrent for a dedicated adversary and
would likely only be a cause of frustration to law enforce-
ment in an urgent situation (e.g., terrorist attack). However,
we note that a time-lock mechanism can be added to JJE as a
modular extension. For example, using recent developments
in Verifiable Delay Function [9, 11], law enforcement can
provide a proof-of-time-elapse to the device when issuing the
unlock token. Taking a different approach, we can use the
ideas presented in [49], to create time-lock puzzles which law
enforcement must break to recover a part of the access token.
Such an approach would both incur a monetary cost and a
time-lock cost (as described in [49]).
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